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Non-technical Summary
Large differences in the unemployment rates of industrialized countries and the under-
lying causes of unemployment have been subject of recurring discussion for a long time.
Since the early 90’s, labor and product market institutions like employment protection
legislation, the unemployment benefit system or the labor tax system moved towards the
center of attention. However, while theoretical papers provide clear predictions about
the impact institutional factors should have on the labor market, empirical contributions
disagree as to which factors are of empirical relevance.
One major problem is that institutional concepts used in theoretical work like the bargain-
ing power of workers are unobservable in reality. Although a large number of indicators is
available, the low number of observations prevents the inclusion of all of them. Empiricists
have therefore to decide which indicators to use in order to capture the effect of a specific
institutional concept. However, this pre-selection could give rise to model mis-specification
and biased results. This paper offers a solution to this problem by using a bayesian model
averaging approach. The major advantage of this method is that a large set of institu-
tional indicators can be tested for significance without running into a degrees-of-freedom
problem and without requiring to specify one particular model. Rather, information of a
large number of models and, particularly, model uncertainty can be taken into account.
The results show that eight institutional indicators are significant. Each equation claim-
ing to explain unemployment in industrialized countriesshould include these indicators as
explanatory variables. More specifically, the payroll and the consumption tax, the first
year and the fourth/fifth year benefits, the barriers to entry and the public ownership, the
bargaining coordination, and the employment protection legislation are of importance. I
check the robustness and reliability of the results by considering heteroskedasticity and
endogeneity. Furthermore, the inclusion of additional control variables and the reduction
of the sample by excluding countries or periods do not change the results substantially.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Die Bestimmung der Gru¨nde fu¨r erhebliche Differenzen in den Arbeitslosenquoten indus-
trialisierter La¨nder steht seit langem auf der Agenda von O¨konomen. Seit den fru¨hen
90ern sind Arbeits- und Produktmarktinstitutionen wie der Ku¨ndigungsschutz oder die
Arbeitslosenunterstu¨tzung in den Fokus geru¨ckt. Allerdings ist es bisher empirischen Pa-
pieren nicht gelungen, die theoretischen Vorhersagen u¨ber den Zusammenhang zwischen
Institutionen und Arbeitslosigkeit zu kla¨ren.
Ein wesentliches Problem ist, dass theoretische Konzepte wie die Verhandlungsmacht der
Arbeitnehmer in der Realita¨t nicht messbar sind. Obwohl eine Reihe an Indikatoren
zur Verfu¨gung steht, verhindert die niedrige Beobachtungszahl deren Einbeziehung. Em-
piriker mu¨ssen deshalb Indikatoren auswa¨hlen, um das theoretische Konzept abzubilden.
Allerdings kann dies zu Modellfehlspezifikationen und fehlerhaften Resultaten fu¨hren.
Dieses Papier nutzt einen baysianischen Ansatz, um diesem Problem beizukommen. Der
wesentliche Vorteil dieser Methode ist, dass so eine gro¨ßere Anzahl an Indikatoren auf Sig-
nifikanz getestet werden kann, ohne dass die Zuverla¨ssigkeit der Ergebnisse leidet.Zudem
ko¨nnen Informationen einer erheblichen Anzahl an Modellen in die Evaluation mit einbe-
zogen werden, um so die Modellunsicherheit explizit zu beru¨cksichtigen.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass acht institutionelle Indikatoren signifikant sind. Demnach soll-
ten diese acht Variablen in Betracht gezogen werden, wenn eine Gleichung zur Erkla¨rung
der Arbeitslosigkeit gescha¨tzt wird. Im Detail sind die Lohn- und Konsumsteuer, die
Lohnersatzraten des ersten und des vierten und fu¨nften Jahres der Arbeitslosigkeit, Mark-
teintrittsbarrieren und Staatseigentum, die Koordination der Lohnverhandlungen sowie
der Ku¨ndigungsschutz von Bedeutung. Die Zuverla¨ssigkeit der Resultate wurde durch die
Beru¨cksichtigung von Heteroskedastizita¨t und Endogenita¨t gepru¨ft. Außerdem a¨ndern
sich die Ergebnisse im Wesentlichen nicht, wenn weitere Kontrollvariablen beru¨cksichtigt
werden sowie eine Verkleinerung des Samples durch den Ausschluss von La¨ndern oder
Perioden durchgefu¨hrt wird.
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Abstract
Labor and product market regulations affect the unemployment rate of a coun-
try without doubt. Econometricians, however, have yet to establish an unequivocal
significance of this impact. Model mis-specification, one of the main underlying
problems, is overcome by adopting a Bayesian Model Averaging approach. I apply
this method to a panel data set that covers 17 OECD countries for the time period
from 1982 to 2005 and for up to 20 potential explanatory variables. 8 institutional
indicators are identified as significant determinants of unemployment. Endogeneity
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timation approach.
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1 Introduction
Over the past two decades a number of theoretical and empirical studies sought to identify
how labor and product market institutions affect the labor market performance of a coun-
try. In this context, factors such as the employment protection legislation, unemployment
benefits and entry barriers for firms have been considered. Theory predicts a clear im-
pact of institutions on labor market performance. Empirical evidence, however, is yet to
confirm the predictions of the theory. The empirical findings fail both to distinguish the
crucial from the less important institutions but also to determine whether deregulation
lowers or raises unemployment. While the inconclusive results can be partially explained
by differences in the time period or the country selection, model mis-specification also
seems to be an important source of error.
When it comes to the explanation of unemployment, specifying the model correctly is a
challenging task. Researchers benefit from a large pool of potentially significant institu-
tional factors, which also makes the decision on which to include or neglect more difficult.
In general, institutional variables can be divided into five groups: tax system, employ-
ment protection legislation, workers’ bargaining power, product market regulation and
unemployment compensation. Each group contains several indicators, measuring differ-
ent aspects. For instance, bargaining centralization, bargaining coordination, minimum
wages, union density and union coverage serve as indicators for the bargaining power of
workers.
In principle, one could estimate a single model containing all explanatory variables and
let the data sort out the important factors. Availability of macroeconomic data is un-
fortunately limited to few periods and countries. This prevents me from conducting the
described method, since the model’s reliability would suffer from the small number of
degrees of freedom. Therefore, in order to exploit the complete available set of data,
and to separate the important and the less important indicators, a consistent analytical
framework is required.
While the outcomes of one single model may not be unreliable, pooling information from
a large set of models can improve the validity of the findings. Sala-i-Martin et al.
(2004) introduce such an approach based on a Bayesian-type model averaging, called
BACE (Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates). The central idea is to estimate a
large set of models containing a varying number of explanatory variables taken from the
pool of all variables. The quality of a model j serves as a weighting coefficient for the
variables kj included in model j. Thus, variables which are incorporated in models with
better fit receive higher weighting than variables in models that exhibit smaller explana-
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tory power. The weights of a variable over all models are summed up and serve as a
measure for evaluating the importance of the factor in explaining the dependent variable.
I expect to identify for a given sets of countries and periods indicators for the variables
that have contributed robustly to the determination of the unemployment rate. Further-
more, the direction of influence can illuminate the ongoing debate on employment-friendly
deregulation reforms and the benefits - if any - of certain institutional rigidities. More
specifically, I hope to clarify which institutional changes in product and labor markets
facilitate and which hinder the efforts to lower the unemployment rate. Finally, the
cross-sectional nature of the data set can shed some light on the question why some coun-
tries have lower unemployment rates than others. The last question concerns especially
the debate between the ”employee-supportive” European system - featuring, e.g., high
employment protection and considerable unemployment benefits - and the more ”market-
friendly” Anglo-American system.
The paper is organized as follows. In the first part of section 2, I give an overview on the
findings of empirical studies dealing with the identification of the direction of influence of
institutional variables on the labor market. The second part of this section recapitulates
the main theoretical considerations about the impact of institutions on the labor market.
Section 3 focuses both on the data as well as on the description of the applied economet-
ric method. Section 4 shows the main empirical results with a corresponding discussion,
while section 5 concludes.
2 Labor and Product Market Institutions
2.1 Inconclusive Empirical Results and Specification Problems
Among studies that have attempted to estimate the effects of institutional factors on un-
employment, Nickell et al. (2005) or Amable et al. (2007) in a dynamic setting,
and Bassanini and Duval (2006) or Baccaro and Rei (2007) for static models
are good examples for analyzes in a cross-country context.1 However, the results are far
from being consistent, showing differences not only in terms of magnitude but also in
terms of direction of influence. Howell et al. (2007) mention three main causes of
the inconclusive results: the selection of the time period, of the institutional indicators,
and the specification of the model. While the first point is hard to tackle since data
limitations restrict the flexibility of choosing the time period, the latter two aspects can
1A more comprehensive overview on cross-country studies dealing with the identification of the insti-
tutional impact can be found in Table 3 in the Appendix.
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be reasonably dealt with.
Researchers studying institutions are confronted with the problem of finding indicators
which are reasonable proxies for an institution. However, for some institutional categories
there are several indicators available which all capture some aspects of an institution. For
example, labor taxes consist of taxes payed by the employer, by the employee, and by the
consumer. The replacement rate can be split up into the benefit payments for different
states of unemployment, say, first year of unemployment or fifth year of unemployment.
The bargaining system can be displayed by, for instance, both the union coverage and the
bargaining coordination. Furthermore, empirical investigations have generally focused on
the impact of labor market institutions on the labor market. The role of product market
regulation for the determination of unemployment has been considered by, for instance,
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) or Griffith et al. (2007). However, to my
knowledge there are no contributions which particularly deal with the identification of
effects on a less aggregate level since in most cases an overall measure of product market
regulation is used.2 This approach assumes homogeneity of different regulation measures
in terms of labor market effects. The selection of indicators is closely related to the ques-
tion of how to specify the model. A priori neglecting indicators would probably lead to
omitted variable bias. Considering all available indicators in one model is often not possi-
ble due to the small size of observations in cross-country panels. An incorrectly specified
model probably provides misleading results, both concerning significance and direction of
influence.
The model averaging framework I apply in this paper enables me to tackle the aforemen-
tioned problems. I can include a large set of institutional indicators without being forced
to preselect an indicator subset. Furthermore, the uncertainty of not knowing the true
econometric model is particularly taken into account. Hence, the main contribution of
the paper to the literature is to focus the empirical discussion on factors which indeed are
correlated to the unemployment rate. This can help future research to confine attention
to relevant variables, leaving out the dispensable ones.
2.2 Theoretical Mechanisms
As argued by Daveri and Tabellini (2000) labor taxes are assumed to affect the
unemployment rate mainly by increasing the cost of labor and, thus, lowering labor de-
mand. Furthermore, the effect of a labor tax increase depends crucially on the degree of
the workers’ bargaining power. The stronger the workers, the more of the tax increase the
2One exception is the study of Fiori et al. (2007).
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firms have to bear. Hence, higher labor taxes only affect labor demand, if the workers’
bargaining power is high. An important point is the utilization of the tax income by
the government. If part of the taxes serve as funding for, say, qualification measures for
unemployed workers to reduce the spell of unemployment, taxes can indirectly help to
reduce unemployment.
The wage level is mainly determined by the bargaining system and bargaining power of
workers and firms. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) show that powerful employees
(represented by strong unions) can demand relatively high wages, resulting in lower la-
bor demand and a considerable rise in the number of unemployed. However, Calmfors
(1993) point to the positive labor market effects if unions take into account the nega-
tive consequences of their bargaining power. More precisely, if unions keep an eye at the
unemployed persons, they will refrain from excessive wage claims for the employed with
beneficial effects for the whole economy.
Furthermore, Stigler (1946) argues that minimum wages reduce labor demand by set-
ting wages above a level which is justified by the workers productivity. Thus, especially
low-skilled workers with wage payments below a (hypothetical) minimum wage are blocked
out from the labor market. Yet, Manning (1995) shows in a model of shirking that min-
imum wages can decrease unemployment by lifting wages to a level at which shirking is
less likely due to the increased incentive to work.
Providing employment protection is usually conducted by imposing severance payments
on the firm or to exacerbate layoffs by legal regulations. Concerning unemployment,
the effect of higher employment protection is assumed to be twofold (see, for instance,
Ljungqvist 2002). On the one hand, it lowers the flows from employment to unem-
ployment since firms take the additional costs for layoffs in consideration when evaluating
the productivity of a worker. On the other hand, labor is allocated less efficiently what
comes along with a fall in productivity and, finally, decreased labor demand.
While the employment protection can be seen as an insurance against getting unem-
ployed, the unemployment benefit system affects predominantly those who are already
out of work. According to Holmlund (1998), an increase of unemployment benefits on
the one hand causes unemployed persons who are eligible to benefit payments to raise
their reservation wage. On the other hand, unemployed who are not eligible to benefits
will have a higher incentive to accept a job in order to get qualified for the benefit pay-
ments in case of future unemployment.
Furthermore, the fear of losing job-specific human capital can convince the workers to
attach no importance to high unemployment benefits (see Arulampalam 2001). In this
case, unemployment benefits will not lower the unemployed workers’ incentive to search
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a job.
Additionally, Acemoglu and Shimer (1999, 2000) mention the beneficial influence of
unemployment insurance if workers are risk averse. Then, high benefits serve as an in-
surance against unemployment, and workers are willing to take jobs associated to higher
unemployment risk but also to higher wages, higher job quality, and, eventually, increased
output and lower unemployment.
The degree of product market regulation affects labor demand through adjusting the
competitive environment in a market. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) show that
increasing competition in a market means more competition for labor if entry barriers are
sufficiently low. Hence, the lower the governmental regulative intervention (e.g. barriers
to entry or public ownership) the lower the unemployment rate.
Nevertheless, a certain degree of barriers to entry can also help to increase the firms’
productivity in a market, as explained by Melitz (2003). This, in turn, can lead to
an increasing demand for labor. Furthermore, a change from public to private ownership
boosts the performance of workers and managers since monitoring is much easier to im-
plement (see Schiantarelli (2008) for a discussion).
Besides the traditional institutional variables, some other factors have been brought into
the discussion. While data on family policies, migration policies, education and training,
active labor market policies, retirement programs as well as the regulation of working
hours are only scarcely available, one other variable deserves to be recognized. Dromel
et al. (2010) recently argued that credit market imperfections can slow down job cre-
ation by restricting access to money for firms. The more access to credits is restricted the
higher unemployment should be. I consider this variable as a control factor.
3 Methodology
3.1 Data
The main purpose of the paper is to analyze the impact of labor and product market
institutions under model uncertainty. In order to ensure comparability to earlier studies,
I rely on established data sources on institutional characteristics.3 The existing data have
been updated, resulting in a comprehensive and balanced data set from 1982 to 2005.
The econometric approach I use requires the application of a panel data without any
3Oswald (1997) argues that house ownership which is an indicator for the workers’ mobility can
contribute to the explanation of unemployment. Nickell et al. (2005) tests this hypothesis and did
not find a significant relationship. Additionally, data is only scarcely available and heavily interpolated.
Therefore, I do not consider this variable in my estimations.
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gaps which is why only 17 OECD countries are included for the investigation. Data on
the unemployment rates is taken from the OECD. I use the harmonized unemployment
rates which are comparable over countries.4 The institutional indicators under inspec-
tion are briefly described in the following. Further information on the construction and
composition of the data set is given in the Appendix.
- The labor tax system is represented by the payroll tax, the income tax, the con-
sumption tax, and the tax wedge which is the sum of the first three taxes.
- Bargaining coordination and centralization, union density and coverage as well as
the minimum wage all cover a part of the bargaining system and the workers’ bar-
gaining power.
- The OECD provides an indicator for the strictness of employment protection.
- I construct indicators for the unemployment benefit system according to Nickell
and Nunziata (2001). Thus, I have an indicator for the replacement rate for the
first year, for the second and third year, and for the fourth and fifth year of unem-
ployment. Additionally, the OECD provides an overall indicator for the replacement
rates which is the average of the three aforementioned partial replacement rates, and
an indicator for the duration of payment which consists of weighted shares of the
first year and the fourth and fifth year benefits. Furthermore, I use a measure for
the coverage of the unemployment benefit system, i.e. how many unemployed are
entitled to receive transfer payments.
- I use indicators for barriers to entry and for public ownership, as well as an overall
indicator for the degree of product market regulation. The overall indicator is the
average of different partial indicators of product market regulation. Note, that the
barriers to entry and the public ownership indicator are included in the overall
indicator. The other parts of the overall indicator cannot be considered since data
is missing for some countries or periods.
- According to Dromel et al. (2010), I include a measure for credit volume
delivered to the private sector over GDP. The higher the value the lower are the
constraints to credits.
4I also run the estimations with data from the Labor Force Surveys collected by the ILO. The results
concerning the significance of indicators remain exactly the same.
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3.2 General Empirical Strategy
The annual unemployment rate is the dependent variable and will be regressed on several
institutional factors which explain the long-run evolution of the unemployment rate, and
on shocks capturing the short-run fluctuations of the unemployment rate. Furthermore,
I use the Within transformation to get rid of time- and country-specific effects. The
equation can be expressed as follows:
UR = X1β +X2γ + ε, (1)
where UR is the unemployment rate NTx1, X1 is a NTxK1 matrix including all institu-
tional factors which influence the unemployment rate in the long run, and X2 is a NTxK2
matrix containing macroeconomic shocks to capture short-run fluctuations. β and γ are
the corresponding coefficient vectors of size K1x1 and K2x1, respectively. N is the number
of countries and T the number of years.5
I follow Nickell et al. (2005) in considering four shock variables. More specifically,
I include productivity shocks, labor demand shocks, real import price shocks and the
real interest rate.6 Unfortunately, it was impossible to construct a money supply shock
variable due to data constraints for the time frame required in this paper. However, the
results in Nickell et al. indicate at most only slight importance of that shock.
3.3 Bayesian Model Averaging
Model mis-specification can lead to severely biased results, mainly due to omitted variable
bias, especially if theory does not provide a clear guide on which variables to include. For
instance, the workers’ bargaining power is an important driver of the unemployment rate,
but it is impossible to quantify. Measures like the union coverage or an indicator for the
degree of bargaining coordination are often used to proxy the bargaining power. However,
there are a lot of potential factors of influence and including all of them is risky due to
limitations in terms of degrees of freedom. One possible solution to this problem is to
avoid specifying a particular model. Rather, this model uncertainty is particularly taken
into account by exploiting information of a large number of models. A particular model
5It is sometimes argued that institutions do not have the same impact in each country, i.e. the pooling
assumption is invalid. The test result for poolability according to Baltagi (2003) mainly depends on
whether I assume an F - or a χ2-distribution. Furthermore, the test results might change when the set
of explanatory variables is altered. The gain of lower variance due to pooling comes at the price of a
potentially incorrect poolability assumption. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the results.
6See the Appendix for further information on the construction.
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consists of the fixed regressors plus a random number of varying regressors. In Bayesian
terms, the expected coefficient value and the variance of variable can be calculated as
follows:
E(β|y) =
2K∑
j=1
P (Mj|y)β̂j (2)
V AR(β|y) =
2K∑
j=1
P (Mj|y)V ar(β|y,Mj) +
2K∑
j=1
P (Mj|y)(β̂j − E(β|y))2 (3)
where P (Mj|y) is the weight of model j in relation to the sum of the weights of all possible
models. Thus,
P (Mj|y) =
P (Mj)NT
−kj/2SSE−NT/2j∑2K
i=1 P (Mi)NT
−ki/2SSE−NT/2i
. (4)
The term SSE considers the sum of squared errors of a regression to account for the
quality of a model, and is corrected for degrees of freedom according to the Schwartz
model selection criterion. N is the number of cross-sections, i.e. countries, T is the
number of time periods, K is the total number of explanatory variables, and k is the
number of explanatory variables in the particular models i and j. P (Mj) is the prior
model probability related to model j. This probability is calculated as
P (Mj) =
(
k
K
)kj (
1− k
K
)K−kj
. (5)
P (Mj) is a weighting factor to correct for the model size, i.e. for the number of explana-
tory variables. k is the prior model size, K is the total number of available explanatory
factors, and kj is the number of explanatory variables included in model j. Models with
a size close to the prior model size is given a higher weight. In doing so, I correct for the
fact, that models with a large number of explanatory variables per se achieve a better
fit than models with only few explanatory factors.7 It is also possible to calculate the
probability that a coefficient has the same sign as its mean conditional on inclusion. This
can serve as a check for the reliability of the results delivered by the posterior inclusion
probability. A sign certainty probability value close to one means that the coefficient sign
of a variable is independent of the model specification.
7For a detailed description of the method I refer to Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004).
8
Note, that I only report the estimation coefficients unconditional on inclusion. Mag-
nus et al. (2010) argue that the conditional estimates overstate the impact of the
explanatory factors on the dependent variable.8
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Baseline Estimation
Applying the model averaging approach gives me the posterior inclusion probability and
the (weighted) coefficient as well as the (weighted) standard deviation for each factor.
Variables with a higher inclusion probability are more likely to be significant explanatory
factors of the dependent variable. In other words, the posterior inclusion probability gives
a measure of the model fit containing this variable compared to models estimated with-
out this variable. A posterior inclusion probability above the prior inclusion probability
complies with a recommendation for including this variable. A value below the prior
probability means omission.
I include 3 indicators concerning taxation, 1 measure for employment protection, 5 indi-
cators of the bargaining system, 2 for product market regulation, and 4 measures for the
unemployment benefit system. An indicator for credit constraints is included as a control
variable. I specify the prior model size to be equal to 6, i.e. I expect that the model
consists of 6 variables. Thus, the prior inclusion probability is 6
16
. The corresponding
estimation output can be found in Table 1, where the variables are sorted in descending
order regarding their posterior inclusion probabilities in column (1). The weighted coeffi-
cients and standard deviations are displayed in columns 2 and 3, while the sign certainty
probability can be found in the fourth column. The employment protection legislation,
the payroll tax, the consumption tax, and the fourth and fifth year benefits are highly
robust with a posterior inclusion probability close to 1. Similarly, the first year benefits,
the public ownership, the barriers to entry and the bargaining coordination also have
posterior inclusion probabilities above the prior. If I additionally include a measure for
benefit duration, the fourth/fifth year benefits lose significance while the newly introduced
duration measure is significant. Hence, the later year benefits can, to some extent, be
8In their paper, Magnus et al. compare different model averaging techniques and proposes a new
method called weighted averaged least squares (WALS). However, to my knowledge, it is questionable
whether this method outperforms the BACE approach applied in this paper in terms of reliability of the
results. One crucial advantage of the WALS method is its computational simplicity. Since I only rely on
up to 18 explanatory variables, the estimations are computationally feasible within the BACE framework
which is why I refrain from using the WALS method.
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Table 1: Baseline estimation
Prior inclusion prob. 0.375 (k = 6)
Variable
Posterior
inclusion
probability
Posterior
mean
Posterior
standard
deviation
Sign
certainty
probability
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Payroll tax 0.99 0.00207 0.00037 1.00
Employment protection 0.99 -0.01816 0.00318 1.00
Credit access 0.99 -0.02017 0.00384 1.00
Consumption tax 0.99 -0.00238 0.00053 1.00
Fourth/Fifth year benefits 0.99 -0.00061 0.00013 1.00
Public ownership 0.94 0.00869 0.00218 1.00
Entry barriers 0.93 -0.00563 0.00156 1.00
Bargaining coordination 0.89 -0.00417 0.00121 0.99
First year benefits 0.82 0.00034 0.00011 0.99
Union coverage 0.26 0.00039 0.00019 0.97
Income tax 0.20 0.00130 0.00064 0.96
Bargaining centralization 0.14 -0.00295 0.00161 0.94
Unemployment benefits coverage 0.07 -0.00549 0.00436 0.87
Minimum wage 0.06 0.00083 0.00079 0.83
Second/Third year benefits 0.05 -0.00006 0.00017 0.64
Union density 0.04 -0.00020 0.00031 0.72
The dependent variable is the unemployment rate. Overall, 65536 (216) estimations have been performed. The shock
variables (labor demand shock, productivity shock, real import price shock and the interest rate) are included in each
regression. Fixed country- and time-specific effects are swept by using the Within transformation (see Baltagi 2003).
seen as a proxy for the benefit duration. Whether the later year benefits or the benefit
duration indicator is included does not affect the remaining indicators.
Turning to the direction of influence, one can see that the majority of robust variables has a
negative impact on unemployment. An increase in the employment protection legislation,
the bargaining coordination, the access to credits, the barriers to entry, the consumption
tax as well as in the fourth and fifth year benefits tends to lower the unemployment rate.
In contrast, the payroll tax, the public ownership, and the first year benefits are positively
related to the unemployment rate. Note that the sign certainty probability measures con-
form to the posterior inclusion probabilities. Significant variables concerning the latter
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measure have sign certainty probabilities close to 1.9
4.2 Alternative Prior Model Sizes and Other Modifications
The prior model size is a factor which serves as a sensitivity check. Such a check has to
focus on the comparison of results produced assuming distinct prior model sizes. In the
baseline specification I have relied on a prior model size of 6. Now I perform the same
estimations for prior model sizes of 2, 4, 8 and 10. Running this kind of sensitivity check
for the baseline estimation shows that most of the outcomes are insensitive to the varia-
tion of the prior model size. I have considered 16 institutional indicators in the analysis,
Table 2: Different inclusion probabilities
Variable
Model size k = 2 k = 4 k = 6 k = 8 k = 10
Prior inclusion probability (0.125) (0.25) (0.375) (0.5) (0.625)
Payroll tax 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Employment protection 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Credit Constraints 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Consumption tax 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Fourth/Fifth year benefits 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Entry barriers 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.95
Public ownership 0.81 0.90 0.93 0.96 0.97
Bargaining coordination 0.72 0.84 0.89 0.91 0.93
First year benefits 0.50 0.72 0.82 0.89 0.93
Union coverage 0.12 0.18 0.26 0.36 0.49
Income tax 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.27 0.34
Bargaining centralization 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.22
Unemployment benefit coverage 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.18
Minimum wage 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.14
Second/Third year benefits 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.12
Union density 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.12
The dependent variable is the unemployment rate. Overall, 65536 (216) estimations have been performed. The shock
variables (labor demand shock, productivity shock, real import price shock and the interest rate) are included in each
regression. Fixed country- and time-specific effects are swept by using the Within transformation (see Baltagi 2003).
so far. However, there are some more institutional variables available. More specifically,
9One might argue that possible endogeneity can bias the outcomes. I set up a model containing all
significant variables with respect to the model averaging procedure, and carried out a two-stage least
squares regression with the lagged variables of the endogenous explanatory factors as instruments. The
results provided in section 4.3, Table 3, show that the results do not change considerably when endogeneity
is taken into account.
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I have indicators for the overall unemployment benefits, the tax wedge, the benefit du-
ration, and the overall product market regulation. I have neglected these indicators in
order to avoid multicollinearity in the estimation. This might occur since the mentioned
indicators are products of some other indicators which I have already considered in the
estimations. For example, the tax wedge is just the sum of the payroll, the income, and
the consumption tax. Including them might vary the findings concerning the indicators
of the same category, while the remaining indicators should show similar results.
Indeed, the inclusion of the four additional variables has only a small impact. Merely the
tax wedge shows robustness with a positive coefficient. The overall benefits, the overall
product market regulation as well as the benefit duration are not significant. Note that
when including the benefit duration the fourth and fifth year benefits inclusion probability
drops independently of the prior model size. Apart from that, the same indicators are
robust, only the inclusion probabilities for some variables fall such that only 4 factors have
an inclusion probability close to 1. This can be explained by the larger number of models
to be estimated. For the model with 16 explanatory variables, I estimate 216, i.e. 65536
different models. The setup with 20 variables and 1048576 models lowers the relative
model quality of each model compared to the remaining models and, consequently, the
posterior inclusion probabilities.
Furthermore, one might argue that the shocks which are included in each single model
have an impact which lasts more than one year. Hence, I extended the set of fixed re-
gressors by taking into account the lagged values of the shock variables. This reduces the
estimation period to 1983 to 2005. Again, I can only report slight changes in the findings.
The inclusion probabilities of the bargaining coordination and the first year benefits drop
considerably but are still clearly above the prior.
Additionally, according to Baccaro and Rei (2007) I included the change in the in-
flation rate and the lagged labor productivity growth as macroeconomic controls. The
results hold independent of the inclusion of both variables. Only the bargaining coordi-
nation posterior inclusion probability drops from 0.88 to 0.63.10
4.3 Single Model Estimation
The model averaging approach serves to identify significant variables. However, it is not
appropriate to allow for several extensions of the econometric model. Hence, I set up
a model consisting of those institutional variables which have been identified as signif-
10The construction of the TFP shock might be exposed to measurement error. Hence, I use a different
factor for this shock, namely the TFP growth rate from the Total Economy Database provided by the
Conference Board. Including this alternative variable has no impact on the results.
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icant in the model averaging framework, additional to the usual shock variables. Once
a reasonable number of institutional indicator is selected, the single model approach is
more flexible. In this single model, I can allow for cross-section heteroscedasticity and
endogeneity. The endogeneity problem is tackled by applying instrumental variable esti-
mation. I use the lagged values of the endogenous variables as instruments. However, I
first have to check whether the lagged values are adequate instruments for the endogenous
factors. I assume that all 8 institutional variables are endogenous and use the two-stage
least squares estimation as my instrumental variable approach. The F-statistic of the
first stage regression of the endogenous variables on the exogenous ones to test for joint
significance of the instruments are displayed in table 3.
Table 3: Test statistics of first stage regressions
Endogenous Variables F-statistic R squared
Payroll tax 124.372 0.811
Consumption tax 104.529 0.783
Bargaining coordination 143.808 0.832
Employment protection 17.024 0.370
Public ownership 118.546 0.803
Entry barriers 207.067 0.877
First year benefits 323.015 0.918
Fourth/Fifth year benefits 81.374 0.737
Results of the first stage regressions according to the two-stage least squares procedure of table 4, columns (3) and (4).
Obviously, the F-statistics of the first stage regressions are above a value of 10 what is
usually seen as the threshold level for weak instruments (see Stock and Staiger 1997).
According to this, by using the lagged values of the endogenous variables as instruments I
can take the endogeneity problem into account. Table 4 presents the results of this single
model estimation.
Specification (2) is estimated with the heteroskedasticity-consistent White estimator.
Specification (3) uses two-stage least squares with the lagged values of the endogenous
variables as instruments. Specification (4) additionally includes the output gap as a con-
trol variable. This has been done to test whether the shock variables are indeed able
to completely capture business cycle dynamics of the unemployment rate. Although the
output gap is highly significant, the institutional results do not change substantially.
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Table 4: Single model estimation
Independent variable: Unemployment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Payroll tax 0.200** 0.200** 0.267** 0.177**
(0.035) (0.035) (0.042) (0.040)
Consumption tax -0.238** -0.238** -0.250** -0.148**
(0.045) (0.044) (0.059) (0.056)
Bargaining coordination -0.407** -0.407** -0.526* -0.488*
(0.271) (0.105) (0.217) (0.195)
Employment protection -1.832** -1.831** -1.764** -1.269**
(0.111) (0.264) (0.312) (0.290)
Public ownership 0.921** 0.921** 1.265** 1.061**
(0.148) (0.168) (0.208) (0.188)
Entry barriers -0.592** -0.592** -0.826** -0.693**
(0.175) (0.145) (0.177) (0.160)
First year benefits 0.032** 0.032** 0.029* 0.029**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Fourth/Fifth year benefits -0.059** -0.059** -0.058** -0.052**
(0.127) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014)
Credit constraints -1.976** -1.976* -1.603** -1.877**
(0.371) (0.350) (0.386) (0.349)
Output gap - - - -0.323**
- - - (0.039)
Instruments no no yes yes
Heteroscedasticity no yes no no
Shocks yes yes yes yes
Countries 17 17 17 17
Time 82 - 05 82 - 05 83 - 05 83 - 05
R squared 0.484 0.484 0.473 0.576
Institutional variables which have been identified as significant within the model averaging framework are included as
explanatory factors. Fixed country- and time-specific effects are swept by using the Within transformation (see Baltagi
2003). Institutions lagged by one year are used as instruments for the contemporaneous institutions. All institutional
variables are assumed to be endogenous in specification (3) and (4). The shock variables are labor demand shock, real
import price shock, TFP shock and the real interest rate. One asterisk marks significance at the 5% level, two asterisks at
the 1% level, standard deviations appear in parenthesis.
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As a further robustness check, I successively exclude 5 year periods from the sample,
starting with the period from 1982 to 1986, then 1987 to 1991, and so on. This sample
reduction has only an impact on the first year benefits which become insignificant for the
panel from 1987 to 2005.
Another check is to leave out each country at a time in specification (2). While the results
for the payroll and the consumption tax, the bargaining coordination, the public own-
ership, the barriers to entry, and the credit constraints still hold, the first year benefits
turn out to be insignificant if I exclude Canada. The effect on the fourth and fifth year
benefits is even more severe. When excluding one of the following countries, Denmark,
the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, or Switzerland, the fourth and fifth year benefits are
insignificant. I interpret this finding as a sign for the heterogeneous impact of the unem-
ployment benefit system in different countries. One reason could be the dependence on
other institutional or macroeconomic conditions.
4.4 Discussion
I expect the tax system to be positively correlated with the unemployment rate. In fact, I
estimate a positive coefficient for the payroll tax rate and for the tax wedge. The income
tax is not significant. Furthermore, the consumption tax is negatively related to the un-
employment rate, i.e. the higher the consumption tax, the lower the unemployment rate.
Studies like Planas et al. (2007) or Daveri and Tabellini (2000) find a negative
labor market impact of labor taxes, but they use a measure which only takes labor taxes
and social security contributions into account. Nickell et al. (2005) for a dynamic
specification or Baccaro and Rei (2007) for a static model report insignificant tax
coefficients. However, both studies include the consumption tax in the tax measure calcu-
lations. On the micro-level, Bennmarker et al. (2009) report positive employment
effects caused by reduced payroll taxes. Assuming a positive impact of higher consump-
tion taxes on the labor market, the insignificant result could be the consequence of two
effects in opposite directions, a negative payroll and a positive consumption tax effect.
The insignificant impact of income taxation seems to support the assumption that the
workers’ bargaining power is not strong enough to shift the burden of an income tax in-
crease on the firms. The positive consumption tax coefficient is, at least at first glance,
difficult to explain since it is hard to imagine why higher taxes should lead to less unem-
ployment. Possibly, the consumption tax rate has not direct effect on the unemployment
rate, but works indirectly on the labor market through a variable which is omitted in
the estimation. One candidate is the spending on active labor market policies, financed
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by the governmental tax revenues. These policies are usually assumed to support the
unemployed to find a job, be it by training, further education or additional qualification.
Indeed, the consumption tax and the almp spending are highly positively correlated. In
contrast, there is no positive relationship between almp and the remaining tax measures.11
Hence, I assume that including an adequate and comprehensive indicator for governmental
training and qualification expenditures would at least dampen the positive consumption
tax effect.12
While five indicators for different aspects of the bargaining system and power have been
analyzed, only one of them turns out to be robustly related to the unemployment rate.
More specifically, the higher the bargaining coordination the better the labor market per-
formance. The bargaining centralization, the union density, as well as the union coverage
do not seem to be of importance. This is in line with the results summarized in Aidt
and Tzannatos (2008). Nickell et al. (2005) also find a negative relationship
between bargaining coordination and unemployment. However, they also report signifi-
cant union density coefficients, what might be caused by the use of a less exact indicator.
The high correlation between the indicators for bargaining coordination and bargaining
centralization of 0.62 indicates, that the impact of the centralization measure is at least
partially captured by the coordination indicator. Furthermore, similar to most empiri-
cal studies, I do not find a robust empirical evidence for a humped-shaped relationship
between bargaining coordination or centralization and the unemployment rate, an idea
originally proposed by Calmfors and Driffill (1988). Depending on the number of
included variables, I get inclusion probabilities slightly above or considerably below the
prior inclusion probabilities for bargaining coordination.
Similarly, minimum wages do not contribute to the evolution of the unemployment rate.
The positive and negative effects of minimum wages seem to cancel each other out. The
result confirms the findings of Addison et al. (2009) (also see the references therein)
on the micro-level, or Bassanini and Duval (2006) in a cross-country framework. Both
studies report no significant impact of minimum wages on labor market performance.
Theoretically, the influence of high employment protection is ambiguous since both the
flows into and the flows out of employment are lowered, and it is unclear, which one
11I did not include an almp measure in the estimations since it is not comprehensively available.
However, I use a measure for governmental public spending in the estimations. The results concerning
consumption taxes remain unchanged, probably due to the fact that public spending does not reliably
capture the spending in training measures.
12It is sometimes argued that consumption taxes are less distortionary and performance-increasing,
compared to income or payroll taxes. Tax systems which are mainly based on consumption taxes should
therefore be less distortionary, with positive effects on the macroeconomic performance. However, the data
does not reveal any systematic relationship between the different tax measures and the unemployment
rate. Countries with higher consumption taxes do not generally have lower income and payroll taxes.
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prevails. The empirical literature does not agree on the labor market effects of em-
ployment protection legislation. While studies like Elmeskov et al. (1998) find an
unemployment-enhancing impact, Baker et al. (2005) report the contrary. Addition-
ally, Baccaro and Rei (2007) do not find any significant effect. The indicator for the
degree of employment protection is highly robust. My findings indicate that a stronger
protection leads to lower unemployment. However, the indicator I use shows only few
time-variation. For some countries there is even no change over the whole period. While
the results indicate the relevance of employment protection at least in terms of the cross-
country dimension, the indicator might not to be able to fully capture all dimensions of
firing restrictions inside a country. This abates the reliability of the results.
The empirical literature on the unemployment benefit system is ambiguous. The micro-
evidence suggests that rising unemployment benefits has probably negative but rather
small effects on the unemployment rate. Lalive (2007) and van Ours and Vodopivec
(2008) find at most a small impact on the unemployment rate of a cut in the duration
of benefit payments. Furthermore, Røed and Zahng (2003) state that an increase in
the unemployment compensation in Norway reduces the escape rate from unemployment.
Nickell et al. (2005) or the OECD (2006) find a clearly negative effect of benefit
levels and, to a smaller extent, of benefit duration on the labor market, while Baker
et al. (2005) report the contrary. Apart from the fact that unemployment benefit
payments are fairly heterogeneous across countries and time I find that high benefits paid
during the first year of unemployment increase the unemployment rate. This is largely
in line with the impact reported in the literature. More interestingly, high benefits for
long-term unemployed seem to lower the unemployment rate. This confirms the findings
of Tatsiramos (2009) who mentions the improved matching quality and the positive
impact on the next post-unemployment job.
The findings concerning the impact on unemployment of product market regulation point
to a positive effect of public ownership and a negative effect of barriers to entry. Grif-
fith et al. (2007) estimated that an increase in competition lowers employment, but
used a less comprehensive data set compared to the one I constructed. Fiori et al.
(2007), using the same indicators as I did, report insignificant public ownership and neg-
ative entry barriers coefficients. However, they focus mainly on product and labor market
interactions and did not pay much attention to the single product market measures. An-
other study using the same data is the one by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005).
They include an overall indicator for product market regulation, the overall indicator less
public ownership, and the public ownership. All three indicators are negatively related to
the labor market performance. Furthermore, Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) show
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for the French retail industry that entry barriers lower employment growth. Hence, my
results with respect to the overall indicator and public ownership confirm previous find-
ings, while the finding concerning the barriers to entry tell a different story compared to
the existing literature.13
5 Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to assess which institutional indicators are related to the equi-
librium unemployment rate for a panel of 17 countries over the last two decades. The
results show that a number of institutional indicators are robustly linked to the evolution
of the unemployment rate. More specifically, robust factors are the employment protec-
tion legislation, the public ownership and the barriers to entry, the payroll tax and the
consumption tax rate, the bargaining coordination, as well as the unemployment ben-
efits for the first year, and the fourth and fifth year of unemployment. Except of the
unemployment benefits for which the impact on the unemployment rates does not seem
to be homogeneous across countries, the results are insensitive to several changes of the
estimation setup.
I find that institutional categories cannot be characterized by one specific indicator, since
for some categories countervailing effects are at work. For example, while the first year
unemployment benefits lower are negatively related to the unemployment rate, high bene-
fits for long-term unemployed are linked to low unemployment rates. Overall, 5 indicators
positively affect the labor market performance. An increase in the employment protection,
entry barriers, bargaining coordination, consumption tax, and the benefits for long-term
unemployed seem to reduce the unemployment rate. Raising the first year benefits, the
payroll tax as well as the public ownership negatively influences the unemployment rate.
This emphasizes the importance of considering the right indicators when dealing with the
empirical assessment of institutions.
One crucial problem of empirical cross-country studies so far has been the difficulty of
specifying the empirical model correctly, mainly due to the large number of possibly
important indicators. My findings can pave the way to a more sophisticated empirical
assessment of the impact of institutions on the labor market by providing a traceable and
reasonable number of institutional indicators. Problems like the design and implemen-
tation of institutional reforms, the identification of institutional interactions or even of
13Note that Fiori et al. (2007) as well as Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) use employment as
the dependent variable. Hence, the impact of regulation on employment and unemployment might not
be directly comparable.
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regulatory frameworks can be tackled with my results in mind.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Literature Overview on Institutions and Unemployment
Table 3 summarizes most of the cross-country studies prepared over the last 15 years,
dealing with the identification of how institutions affect the labor market. I prepared this
table in the style of Howell et al. (2007). A positive impact through an increase in
an institution on the labor market (for instance, a lower unemployment rate) is indicated
by pos, the contrary is displayed by neg, and an insignificant effect is insig. Since most
of the studies estimate several specifications, there might be a positive, negative and
insignificant effect for one institutional indicator in one study.
Table 5: Summary for the effects on unemployment of changes in institutions
Study EPL RR Level RR Dur UD UC BCO BCE Taxes
Scarpetta 1996 neg/insig neg — neg — pos — insig
Nickell 1997 insig neg neg neg neg pos — neg
Elmeskov et al.
1998
neg/insig neg — pos/insig — pos insig neg/insig
Blanchard/Wolfers
2000
neg/insig neg/insig neg neg/insig insig neg — neg/insig
IMF 2003 neg pos/insig/neg — neg — pos — neg
Belot/van Ours
2004
pos/insig pos/insig/neg — neg/insig — — pos/insig neg/insig
Baker et al. 2005 pos/insig pos/insig pos/insig insig insig pos/insig neg/insig —
Nickell et al. 2005 insig neg neg/insig neg/insig — pos — neg/insig
Nicoletti/Scarpetta
2005
neg/insig neg/insig — neg — pos/insig — neg
Bassanini/Duval
2006
pos/insig neg/insig neg pos/insig — pos/insig — neg
OECD 2006 insig neg neg neg/insig — pos — neg
Baccaro/Rei 2007 insig insig — neg/insig — neg/insig — pos/insig
Dority/Fuess 2007 — neg/insig insig — pos/insig pos/insig — —
Amable et al. 2007 pos/insig neg/insig — neg/insig — pos/insig — insig
The abbreviations have been taken from the literature. EPL=Employment Protection Legislation, RR Level=Amount
Replacement Rates, RR Dur=Duration Replacement Rates, UD=Union Density, UC=Union Coverage, BCO=Bargaining
Coordination, BCE=Bargaining Centralization, Taxes=Labor Taxes.
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6.2 Data Sources and Construction
All variables are on an annual basis and have been gathered for the period from 1982
to 2005. Note, that the data set is balanced. The countries included in the analysis are
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. For countries like Ireland, Portugal, New Zealand or Korea some data is
missing which is why I had to exclude them.
6.2.1 Unemployment Rate
The dependent variable in the empirical analysis is the harmonized unemployment rate
taken from the OECD key short-term economic indicators database. Some data is missing
for earlier periods of some countries. To ensure consistent time series, I calculate the
growth rates of the unemployment rate as a percentage of civilian labor force (which
is not harmonized) and extend the harmonized unemployment rates by concatenating
the change of the country-specific unemployment rate. Of course, this could give rise
to criticism since it is doubtful whether the unemployment rates for early periods are
comparable or not. However, only Austria from 1982 to 1992, Germany from 1982 to
1990 and Switzerland from 1982 to 1991 are affected by this adjustment. Therefore, I
prefer to have a larger data set at the expense of a probably small bias.
To check for robustness, I also use the unemployment rates based on labor force surveys
provided by the ILO. When data is missing, observations have been constructed based
on the growth rates of the employment office records unemployment rates using the same
approach as for the OECD series.
6.2.2 Institutions
I have four indicators for the tax system, the payroll tax, the income tax, the consumption
tax rate, and the sum of these three factors, which is the tax wedge. The taxes have been
constructed according to the definition given in Nickell and Nunziata (2001).
The payroll tax t1 is calculated as
t1 =
ess
ie− ess (6)
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with ess equal to the employer’s social security contributions and ie equal to the com-
pensation of employees. The income tax t2 is
t2 =
it
hcr
(7)
where it is the direct tax spending and hcr the household current receipt. Finally, the
consumption tax t3 is the result of
t3 =
tls
fce
(8)
with tls equal to taxes less subsidies on products and imports and fce equal to the fi-
nal consumption expenditure of households. The tax wedge tw is calculated as tw =
t1 + t2 + t3.
Note that I did not just update the Nickell and Nunziata data but recalculated the whole
series. Some considerable changes compared to the Nickell and Nunziata data occurred
probably due to data updates made by the OECD.
Overall, four indicators for the bargaining system and power are available. The union
density, union coverage, minimum wages, bargaining coordination and bargaining central-
ization all have been taken from the Visser database (see Visser 2009). The bargaining
coordination is an index ranging from 1 to 5 with 1 indicating fragmented bargaining at
the company level, and 5 indicating economy-wide bargaining. The bargaining centraliza-
tion is an indicator from 1 to 5 and shows the level at which the bargaining is conducted.
1 means very low centralization at the company level and 5 on a national level. The min-
imum wage indicator ranges from 1 (no minimum wage) to 8 (national minimum wage
set by the government). The union density indicator consists of the percentage of wage
and salary earners which are organized in a union. The union coverage indicator shows
the percentage of employees whose wage bargaining is affected by wage bargaining agree-
ments.
The employment protection legislation indicator ranges from 0 to 6. The higher the value
the higher the degree of protection. The indicator is taken from the OECD labour statis-
tics database.
According to Nickell (2006), I construct the replacement rates for the first year, the
second and third year, as well as for the fourth and fifth year of unemployment as indi-
cators for the unemployment benefit system. Additionally, I include an overall indicator
for the level of benefits which is the unweighted average of the three sub-measures, and a
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measure for the benefit duration. The benefit duration indicator bd equals
bd = 0.6
brr23
brr1
+ 0.4
brr45
brr1
(9)
where brr23 are the second and third year benefits, brr45 the fourth and fifth year benefits,
and brr1 the first year benefits. Since the OECD provides such detailed series only until
2003, I had to update the series with help of the OECD tax benefit models available
on the OECD homepage. Hence, I use the definitions given by the OECD (see OECD
1994, Chapter 8) to update the series. Note that the tax benefit models provide data on
unemployment benefits which are biased for some countries. The particular time series
have to be checked and adjusted according to the country-specific definitions available at
the OECD homepage (the current link which leads to the country-specific files on benefits
and wages is
http://www.oecd.org/document/29/0,3343,en 2649 34637 39618653 1 1 1 1,00.html ).
The Fondazione Rodolfo de Benedetti delivers data on unemployment benefit coverage for
the complete period as a fraction of job seekers entitled to benefits over the total number
of job seekers. Some observations are missing for Belgium (2000-2005), Italy (1982-1989
and 2003-2005), Sweden (1982-1994), Switzerland (1982-1984) and the United Kingdom
(1996). In order to include it in the model averaging approach, I assign the missing
observations the same value as the first preceding or successive observation with a valid
value. If both a preceding and successive value is available, I construct the mean.
Data on product market regulation come from the OECD, as well. I use the regulation
indicators in energy, transport and communication sectors (ETCR). This database delivers
information on the barriers to entry and on public ownership for the described sectors.
I use the aggregate indicators in the empirical section. Note that the aggregate ETCR
indicator consists of the barriers to entry, the public ownership, and some additional
indicators. These additional indicators are not comprehensively available over sectors
which is why I cannot take them into account. For a detailed description about the
construction of the product market regulation data see Conway and Nicoletti (2006).
6.2.3 Shock Variables and Macroeconomic Controls
Generally, I closely follow the approach proposed by Nickell et al (2005). Note that
all data which are required for the construction of the shock variables are provided by
the OECD. I construct four shock variables which probably influence the unemployment
rate in the short run. The real import price is the import price deflator divided by the
GDP deflator. According to the following equation, the shock is the log change of the
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real import price (IPS) times the import share in GDP.
IPS =
Imports
GDP
log
(
IPdeflator
GDPdeflator
)
(10)
with IPdeflator being the import price deflator.
The real interest rate is the long-term interest rate corrected for the current inflation
rate.
For the construction of the total factor productivity (TFP) shocks I follow Bassanini
and Duval (2006) and calculate first the change in the log of TFP as
∆ln(TFP ) =
∆ln(Y )− α∆ln(TE) + (1− α)∆ln(K)
α
(11)
with Y equal to the GDP in the business sector, TE is total employment, K the gross
capital stock, and α the share of labor income in total business sector income. By cumu-
lating the changes in the log TFP’s over years I get the TFP in each year. Finally, I take
the deviations from the TFP trend to construct an index for TFP shocks by applying the
Hodrick-Prescott filter with a λ of 100.
The labor demand shock is the change in the residuals of a labor demand model to be
estimated. Hence, I estimate the following equation for each country and take ε as the
country-specific labor demand shock.
ln(TEt) = β0 + β1ln(TEt−1) + β2ln(TEt−2) + β3ln(TEt−3) + β4ln(Yt) + β5ln(LCt) + εt.
(12)
Again, TE is total employment, Y is the real GDP and LC are the real labor costs per
employee. The real labor costs are calculated as the total labor costs of the total economy
divided by the number of dependently employed workers.
Data on the change in the inflation rate is taken from the OECD database. Following
Baccaro and Rei (2007) I construct this variable as CPIt − CPIt−1.
The lagged labor productivity growth (LPG) is the series provided by the OECD. For
Austria, information is only available from 1996 on. I use the Total Economy Database
information on labor productivity (GDP per hour worked) and extend, using the OECD
approach, the labor productivity growth series for Austria as (ln(LPGt−ln(LPGt−1)∗100.
Data on public spending on active labor market policy is provided by the OECD.
For the credit constraints I use data from Beck and Demirg-Kunt (2009). More
specifically, the indicator for private credit by deposit money banks and other financial
institutions over GDP is used.
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The output gap series are delivered by the OECD.
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